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Abstract. This article revisits and applies the securitization theory in assessing 
securitization and desecuritization of Russia in the national security and state 
defence concepts of Latvia. The analysis covers the editions of concepts from 
1995 up to the date. With the benefit of the quantitative and qualitative content 
analyses, all mentions of Russia in those fourteen documents are classified as 
either securitizing, desecuritizing or nonsecuritizing. Further, they are analysed in 
the wider picture of national security. It is concluded that most of Latvia’s 
national security and state defence documents have reflected the perception of 
the existent security situation, and they have been limited in their pre-emptive 
and future-proof nature, at least regarding Russia. In most of the editions of the 
documents prior to the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Russia has been essentially 
undersecuritized as compared to the then existing potential of risks and threats. 
Meanwhile, the final editions from 2015 and on hint that Russia might be 
oversecuritized – not least compared to the earlier documents, but also at the 
expense of securitizing other objective threats. 
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Securitization theory has come a long way since it was first coined and developed by Ole Wæver of the 
Copenhagen School of International Relations. The approach to securitization has been widely addressed 
and further developed from various theoretical and methodological angles. It has also been vastly employed 
in the variety of empirical studies aiming at uncovering the construction and the deconstruction of security 
processes and strategic security narratives. The analysis of securitization and desecuritization also allows 
reflecting upon and understanding the underlying causes and dynamics of national security and defence 
preferences and conceptual formulation.   
This article applies the securitization theory to the analysis of almost three decades of evolving national 
security and state defence concepts in Latvia. More specifically, the aim of this study is to analyse the trends 
of securitization and desecuritization of Russia in the documents that outline the basic assumptions and 
actions to be taken regarding the national security and state defence of Latvia. Such analysis of Russia in the 
national security and state defence policy of Latvia provides a peculiar case for study. On the one hand, it 
is indeed common knowledge that both countries had and still have uneasy relations and that Russia is seen 
as the main source of risks to Latvian national security. On the other hand, relations between both have 
been more complex than that, having fluctuated over the past three decades. With the approach employed 
in this study, it also offers a different & structured perspective of Latvia’s perception of Russia during the 
almost three decades in question.  
In order to achieve the aim, first, the theory of securitization has to be reviewed. Based on the review 
of the theoretical aspects to be employed in analysis, a background of the national security and defence 
concepts of Latvia has to be outlined. Further, the methodological outlook for building the conceptual 
apparatus, i.e., classifying and explaining securitization and desecuritization moves towards Russia in a wider 
national security and state defence environment has to be provided. Finally, national security and state 
defence planning documents have to be vetted, and securitization and desecuritization processes have to be 
traced there.  
Given the aforementioned tasks, this study is structured in three main sections, the introduction and 
the results & conclusions. The second section proceeds with a review of the securitization theory, focusing 
on the structure of securitization and desecuritization processes. The third section builds the empirical part 
by assessing and contextualizing the national security and state defence planning documents of Latvia. The 
fourth section, comprising the discussion, provides the methodological framework for an in-depth analysis 
of the related documents. Further, with the help of quantitative and qualitative content analyses, it reviews 
all national security and state defence concepts of Latvia in the period from 1995 to 2020, i.e., from the first 
to the current ones. In particular, it looks into the dynamics, the frequency and the way Russia has been 
invoked in the basic security and defence documents. It seeks to uncover what factors have underpinned 
the securitization and desecuritization moves. Furthermore, given the assumption of the Copenhagen 
School that securitization is intersubjective, the article also seeks to assess if Russia has been oversecuritized 
or undersecuritized in the contextual setting. 
2. THE THEORETICAL APPROACH – CONSTRUCTION AND 
DECONSTRUCTION OF SECURITY ISSUES IN TERMS OF SECURITIZATION 
AND DESECURITIZATION 
The theory of securitization seeks to explain as to how ordinary or non-security issues become security 
issues, and the opposite process – how security issues become non-security issues. In other words, it 
provides a structured framework for analysis on how and why certain issues become or do not become 
security issues, as well as to who and why stands behind such processes. The theory was first outlined and 
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developed by Wæver in the end of 1980s and later on (e.g., Wæver, 1989; Wæver, 1995). It was most 
authoritatively and clearly articulated by Wæver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde in their collaborative work 
of 1998 (Buzan et al., 1998). The later work serves in this article as the central point for conceptual reference 
of the main elements of the theory.  
Securitization and desecuritization processes can either succeed or fail. Success depends on various 
actors and factors. Ultimately, it is the audience (usually – domestic society, though it can be another group, 
depending on the type of the security issue and the level of analysis) that determines success of the 
securitization process. If the audience accepts presentation of a referent object (usually – state, though it 
can be another subject) as existentially threatened, the referent object is considered as existentially 
threatened. Thus, it becomes a security issue, paving way for exceptional measures to mitigate the threat. If 
securitization fails, the process concludes as a securitizing move. The referent object is securitized by a 
securitizing actor, such as state institutions, politicians or interest groups (the securitizing actor can securitize 
itself, as it often happens with states via their representatives). Success or failure of securitization depends 
also on the facilitating conditions and functional actors, especially to the influence and position of the 
securitizer and other actors involved in the process (Buzan et al., 1998, p.21.-42).  
In the traditional sense of the theory, securitization is conducted via a speech act (Buzan et al., 1998, 
p.26). The focus on verbal expression has been confronted from the methodological position, given that 
certain issues that objectively would be security issues cannot be articulated as such because of the inability 
of some referent objects or others to securitize them (Hansen, 2000, p.287). Also, other forms of expression 
of securitization have been suggested – such as the visual securitisation where visuals substitute verbal 
expressions (Hansen, 2011, p.68-69), (physical) action when something is done instead of or before verbal 
articulation (Wilkinson, 2007, p.21-22), or bureaucratic proceedings (McDonald, 2008, p.568-569).  
Desecuritization, less studied compared to securitization, is normatively favoured by the Copenhagen 
School because issues should preferably be resolved as a part of ordinary politics (Buzan et al., 1998, p.29). 
Yet, according to others, a mere preference to desecuritization might solely subdue the issue, but not fix it 
(as summarized by Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.217). Desecuritization itself does not necessarily need to be 
conducted by limiting the security language on the relevant issue (Wæver, 1995, p.60). As summarized by 
Paul Roe, it can also take place either by managing or transforming the security issue (Roe, 2004, p.285). 
The management option is a reference to Wæver, i.e., retaining an issue in security realm but averting security 
dilemmas and similar concussions (Wæver, 2000, p.253), whereas the transformation option is about 
bringing the security issue out of the security realm to the ordinary politics (Roe, 2004, p.285) and making 
it a a-security issue (Ibid; Wæver, 1998, p.81). 
3. THE CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND – NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE 
CONCEPTS AND LATVIA 
In the context of national security, as far as it is understood as state security, it is relatively easy to 
determine and analyse securitizing actors. Typically, it is clearly defined who is authorized to speak and act 
for a state. Though, things can get more complicated with nations as referent objects. Also, other actors can 
rightfully speak and act on their behalf (Buzan et al., 1998, p.41-42).  
In the case of Latvia, national security is defined in a broad and long manner. Nevertheless, the 
definition principally focuses on security of state and society – “…a state, attained as a result of joint, 
purposeful measures implemented by the State and society, in which the independence of the State, its 
constitutional structure and territorial integrity, the prospect of free development of society, welfare and 
stability are guaranteed” (Saeima, 2002a, a.1). 
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National security and state defence strategies (or concepts) commonly define basic assumptions and 
actions for maintaining and promoting national security and state security. In the case of Latvia, these are 
the national security concepts and state defence concepts. The first covers a wide spectrum of security issues 
(including non-military) and therefore “…determines the basic strategic principles and priorities for the 
prevention of danger to the State,” whereas the latter focuses on military issues as it “…determines the basic 
strategic principles, priorities and measures of the State military defence during peacetime, danger to the 
State and a state of war.” Both are based on analysis prepared by the state security institutions – the Analysis 
of Danger to the State and the Analysis of Military Threat respectively (Saeima, 2002a, a.27, 29).  
Since 2000s, both documents, respectively security and defence concepts, are approved by Saeima, the 
Parliament (prior to that – by the Cabinet of Ministers and the National Security Council). The parliament 
has the right to introduce changes in the version put forth by the government. The National Security 
Concept is prepared by the Cabinet of Ministers, or more specifically by the Ministry of Interior (2019) and 
reviewed by the National Security Council. The State Defence Concept is prepared by the Ministry of 
Defence and reviewed by the Cabinet of Ministers. Both documents have to be approved in every four-year 
term of the parliament – in the first and the second year of the term accordingly (Saeima, 2002a, a.27, 29).  
Hitherto seven editions of the National Security Concept have been approved – in 1995 (Cabinet of 
Ministers, 1995a), in 2002 (Saeima, 2002b), in 2005 (Saeima, 2005), in 2008 (Saeima, 2008a), in 2011 (Saeima, 
2011), in 2015 (Saeima, 2015), and in 2019 (Saeima, 2019). In the same period of time, also seven editions 
of the State Defence Concept were approved – in 1995 (Cabinet of Ministers, 1995b), in 2001 (Saeima, 
2001), in 2003 (Saeima, 2003), in 2008 (Saeima, 2008b), in 2012 (Saeima, 2012), in 2016 (Saeima, 2016) and 
in 2020 (Saeima, 2020). 
Given the aforementioned, the securitizing actor is the state (the Republic of Latvia) in the form of 
institutions representing it (state security institutions and ministries as bureaucratic structures, as well as the 
Cabinet of Ministers, the National Security Council and the Parliament as collegiate organizations). The 
documents emerge as a result of inter-institutional interaction processes among those mentioned above and 
along with others (e.g., other ministries and institutions or non-governmental players taking part in 
discussing the draft documents). As the initial drafting process is not public, it is not entirely clear as to what 
is the precise role of one or the other institution (i.e., interaction of ministries and related institutions and 
their internal structures and role of individuals).  
In terms of securitization, at least two target audiences can be identified. First, the society of Latvia as 
the documents become publicly available and their main points are communicated to the society by the state 
institutions and mass media. Second, as both documents are translated and communicated beyond Latvia, 
it is the international society at large, and allied countries along with others (also the securitized ones) in 
particular. 
4. DISCUSSION – SECURITIZATION AND DESECURITIZATION OF RUSSIA IN 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE CONCEPTS OF LATVIA 
What follows, is an analysis of all fourteen Latvian national security and state defence concepts 
approved to the date. The section identifies and assesses securitization moves vis-à-vis Russia as the implied 
threat to the national security.  
In order to reveal the key developments and characteristics of securitization process, the current section 
is further organized in four sub-sections. It starts with a methodological outline and a quantitative review 
of securitization and desecuritization of Russia in the concepts of Latvia (section 4.1). Then it proceeds to 
the review and analysis of securitization and desecuritization across the fourteen documents, further split in 
three continuous sub-sections. These sub-sections are organized over the lines of three distinct periods of 
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national security environment: from 1995 to 2003, covering the concepts issued before Latvia’s accession 
to the European Union (hereafter – EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter – NATO) 
– a period characterized by avoidance to securitize Russia along the road to the Euro-Atlantic structures 
(section 4.2); from 2005 to 2012, covering the concepts issued after Latvia joined both international 
organizations – a period characterized by both initial avoidance to securitize Russia right after the accession 
to EU and NATO and a mix of desecuritization and securitization moves after the 2008 Russian-Georgian 
military conflict and economization and pragmatization attempts of Latvia’s engagement with Russia 
(section 4.3); and, finally, from 2015 to 2020, covering the concepts issued in the so-called post-Crimea 
security environment that transcended into a widespread securitization of Russia (section 4.4). 
4.1. The methodological approach in classifying securitization and desecuritization of 
Russia in the national security and state defence concepts of Latvia  
The following Figure 1 maps the number of mentions of Russia in all national security and defence 
strategic documents of Latvia since 1995. According to the criteria advanced by the authors, a mention of 
Russia is classified as securitizing if the securitized subject (Russia) is presented in security context and in a 
negative form – as a threat to the national security, preferably (from the analytical perspective) with a call to 
take measures to mitigate the threat. A mention of Russia is classified as desecuritizing if the securitized 
object is described in a neutral or positive form and as an opportunity and/or necessity for engagement and 
cooperation. Finally, a mention is classified as nonsecuritizing if it is described purely neutrally and as a 
contextual factor or subject – neither as a clear risk, nor an opportunity (seemingly neutral mentions in 
negative and thus securitizing contexts are classified among securitizing ones).  
For the ensuing analysis, national security and state defence concepts in the original language, Latvian, 
are studied in order to ensure consistency and precision. Even though some of these documents have an 
official English translation, official translations of others have not been identified.  
 
 
Figure 1. Securitization and desecuritization of Russia in the national security and defence 
concepts of Latvia from 1995 to 2020 
Source. Cabinet of Ministers, 1995a, 1995b; Saeima, 2001, 2002b, 2003, 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2011, 2012, 
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On the one hand, this presentation of data should be treated with a degree of caution. Purely 
quantitative approach in identifying mentions of securitized subjects (threats) has its limitations as the 
number of mentions might or might not precisely reflect the intensity of securitization or desecuritization. 
First, the securitized object (threat) might be mentioned in texts in a roundabout way, e.g., by using other 
phrases. Second, some mentions are used in a context of stronger language, while others include milder 
wording. Third, length and style of the documents differs and thus the place of the mentions of securitized 
subjects (threats). Fourth, desecuritization can occur also by intentionally avoiding speaking about the 
securitized object (Wæver, 1995, p.60), and thus the lack of mentions can be considered as desecuritization 
per se. Fifth, some mentions provide difficulties in drawing a clear line between either securitizing, 
nonsecuritizing or desecuritizing ones. Sixth, possibly, in some cases, securitization or desecuritization was 
unintentional, i.e., the final text resulted from compromises of contrasting proposals.  
On the other hand, and as explained in the sub-sections that follow, the number of mentions of Russia 
generally well corresponds to the ups and downs in Latvian-Russian relations. Also, visualization of data in 
a single figure helps to reflect the general identifiable trends of securitization and desecuritization dynamics. 
Furthermore, to mitigate and elaborate issues mentioned in the previous paragraph, the following sub-
sections address them in further detail.  
4.2. Securitization and desecuritization of Russia in the national security and state 
defence concepts of Latvia, 1995-2003 
The first defence and security concepts of Latvia were adopted in 1995. It was the year when Latvia 
formally set its course towards accession to the EU and NATO and a year after the withdrawal of the armed 
forces of Russia (the Skrunda Radio Location Station continued its operation until 1998). Thus, Latvia’s 
national security and defence context was primarily determined by the road towards the EU and NATO. 
As a part of that, Latvia faced expectations from the EU, NATO and the United States to avoid unnecessary 
securitization of Russia. It was a difficult balance, particularly underlined by the 1998 events in Riga when 
police adjourned by force a non-sanctioned protest of (mainly) Russian-speaking pensioners. Russia 
retaliated with blunt criticism and informal economic sanctions.  
In the aforementioned context, the first national security and state defence concepts do not securitize 
Russia. While the defence concept even does not mention Russia by its name (Cabinet of Ministers, 1995b), 
the security concept mentions it twice. First, it does so by seeking to “maintain normal neighbouring 
relations with Russia and other CIS states [Commonwealth of Independent States]” in the context of 
Latvia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Second, by seeking the involvement of Russia (along international 
organizations) in efforts to avoid incidents regarding the operation of Skrunda Radio Location Station 
(Cabinet of Ministers, 1995a, ch.4.1, 4.5). 
The next editions of both documents were approved on the eve of Latvia’s NATO and EU accession 
(these are the state defence concepts of 2001 and 2003, and the national security concept of 2002). These 
documents do mention Russia. The state defence concept of 2001 mentions it three times in three 
continuous sentences: desecuritizing it with mentioning the road towards a market economy and democratic 
society in Russia and reduction of its armed forces, while ostensibly securitizing it with a mention of 
instability and difficulties in anticipating its further development path (Saeima, 2001, ch.2).  
The next, the 2002 national security concept, includes eight mentions of Russia (most of them in 
conjunction with Belarus). This document provides difficulties in drawing a clear line between 
nonsecuritization and desecuritization mentions. A mention of the 1998 economic crisis in Russia in the 
context of Latvian economy can be considered as a fairly nonsecuritizing. Meanwhile, other mentions speak 
of Russia as a part of the regional cooperation, importance of its further development path to Latvia, the 
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attained bilateral legal base (described as having contributed to the regional security), as well as the need to 
reach further intergovernmental agreements and border demarcation (Saeima, 2002b, ch.2.1, 2.2.3, 3.1, 
3.2.5).   
Finally, the 2003 state defence concept mentions it once and it can be interpreted as desecuritizing. It 
underlines Russia among NATO partners, cooperation with whom “…promotes trust, security, stability 
and openness in Europe” (Saeima, 2003, ch.3.4.4).  
4.3. Securitization and desecuritization of Russia in the national security and state 
defence concepts of Latvia, 2005-2012 
Latvia joined both the EU and NATO in 2004. Membership in both organizations, NATO in 
particular, amid the perceived lack of threat from Russia initially encouraged a new sense of security. While 
Latvia’s armed forces refocused from military territorial defence to expeditionary military capabilities, 
between 2005 and 2007 Latvia’s President and Prime Minister travelled to Moscow, and the border 
agreement between both countries was completed.  Hence, the first national security concept of Latvia in 
the status of NATO and EU member (issued in 2005) does not mention Russia a single time (Saeima, 2005), 
and so does the first state defence concept in the status of NATO member (Saeima, 2008b).  
The rapprochement with Russia was challenged by the increasingly assertive Russia’s foreign policy 
culminating then with the 2008 Russian-Georgian war. While the war was widely conceived as a concussion 
to the regional security, it had only short-term effect on Latvia’s security and defence policy, partly illustrated 
by the 2008 national security concept that was not updated to assess the consequences of the war. Though 
formally adopted by the parliament in October 2008, this document was examined by the National Security 
Council before the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 (Saeima, 2008c). It mentions Russia twice. On 
the one hand, finalization of the border agreement with Russia is underlined as “…establishing a qualitative 
improvement of security environment of Latvia.” On the other hand, Russia’s decision to suspend the 
implementation of its obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is seen as 
contributing to “…the reduction of mutual trust and predictability…” (Saeima, 2008a, introduction, ch.1).  
One of the main reasons for the continued pragmatization and economization of Latvia’s approach to 
Russia was the global economic and financial crisis, as well as the so-called reset of the US-Russia relations 
in 2009. Two further visits of the president of Latvia to Moscow in 2010 serve as examples of Latvia’s 
perception of the external security environment of that time.  
The following national security concept of 2011 mentions Russia five times. It sends mixed signals. On 
the one hand, it somewhat securitizes Russia with mentions of the 2008 military conflict in Georgia and 
Russia-Belarus military exercises as “…events casting doubts about the intentions of neighbouring 
countries,” along with a reference to Russia’s self-defined animosity towards NATO. On the other hand, 
the importance of mutual trust and further NATO-Russia engagement as “…a factor to international 
security promotion” is stressed (Saeima, 2011, ch.3.1).  
To conclude this period, the 2012 state defence concept mentions Russia three times. All of them seem 
to be aimed at desecuritizing it. The document describes cooperation with Russia as “an aspect that 
contributes to the strengthening of stability and security of the Baltic Sea region,” and it calls for promotion 
of transparency and trust, as well as limited military cooperation with it and involvement of it in the exercises 
that are open to NATO partners (Saeima, 2012, ch.48).  
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4.4. Securitization and desecuritization of Russia in the national security and state 
defence concepts of Latvia, 2015-2020 
The remaining Latvia’s national security and state defence concepts take a different twist as result of 
the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The conflict shattered the European security environment. Security and defence 
policy of Latvia was no exception. Russia came to dominate most aspects of national security concerns of 
Latvia. Accordingly, threats from Russia obviously occupy the core of the remaining documents. The first 
of them, the 2015 national security concept, names Russia 43 times, commencing with a statement that 
“Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has created significant challenges to the European security and global 
international order.” Implications of the conflict in Ukraine are further elaborated both in the description 
of the security environment and in the actions to be taken by Latvia. In characterizing actions of Russia, its 
progress in military capabilities and readiness is stressed along with its use of intricate means in pursuit of 
its foreign policy objectives, intentional creation of devious conflict areas in its direct vicinity, also internal 
presentation of NATO as its adversary, as well as the influence efforts of Russia in Latvia (Saeima, 2015, 
ch.3). 
Remaining on the 2015 security concept, among the tasks set forth by the concept, Russia implicitly 
dominates most of the areas: countering foreign intelligence (“…the greatest danger is posed by intelligence 
agencies of Russia”), countering military threats (“Russia’s … [actions] necessitate a comprehensive 
approach to the evasion of the threat”), countering threats to the unity of population (e.g., “…Russia 
intentionally splits the Latvian society…”), threats to the information space (e.g., “Russia’s … [actions] are 
the main external threat to the information space of Latvia…”), and threats in the cyberspace. In regard to 
economic threats, Russia in named twice, in the context of its economic downturn and trade restrictions. 
Both can be interpreted as nonsecuritizing mentions as Russia is not presented as an existential threat, while 
mitigation of the situation is proposed not by counteractions to it, but by deviation of external economic 
vectors of Latvia. Finally, while not naming Russia, risks with regard to it are mentioned as notable issues 
in the areas of internal security, as well as the energy and cargo transport flows (Saeima, 2015, ch.4.1-4.6, 
4.8).  
The 2016 state defence concept mentions Russia 20 times. All of them directly or indirectly securitize 
it, commencing that “Russia’s aggression in Ukraine” has caused a “concussion of the European security 
environment” and stressing that thus “…Russia ruins the existing international order”. The document 
proceeds with such takes on Russia as the promotion of hostility to NATO and EU countries in the Russian 
society, other military activities of Russia outside its borders, display of its military force, enhancement of 
its armed forces, and increase of threats from Russia across various fields, including the information space, 
cyberspace, energy and economics. Mentions of Russia conclude with an unambiguous hint at the military 
threat it poses – “…Russia develops and exercises capabilities that can be used to launch an unexpected 
military assault against the Baltic states…” (Saeima, 2016, ch.5-10, 12-13).  
The current national security concept of 2019 mentions Russia 65 times. This document tops the list 
of all those since 1990s both in terms of the number of mentions and the intensity of securitization of 
Russia. Russia is named in every single section of the concept, except the one devoted to the international 
terrorism. Similar to the previous concept, Russia is securitized across a wide spectrum of national security 
issues. The document underlines that “[t]he military dimension [of the national security of Latvia] is 
characterized by military activities of Russia in the Baltic region and also other hybrid form security risks 
and threats directed against Latvia” (Saeima, 2019, ch.1-9). 
Apart from characterization of the 2019 concept itself and the national security and the external 
environment, Russia is further securitized in chapters on countering military threats (e.g., “… its employed 
aggressive security policy in the Baltic region is considered the main source of threats to the national security 
of Latvia”); on countering foreign intelligence (e.g., “[t]he most significant threat to the collective security 
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of NATO and EU member states and to the national security and interests of Latvia are posed by the 
intelligence services of Russia”); on countering cyber-threats (“…Russia extensively uses the cyberspace not 
only for espionage, but also for conducting information operations and destructive actions”); on countering 
threats to the internal security (e.g., “Russia uses compatriots’ policy as an instrument for involving 
compatriots in influence activities of Russia that are directed against the national security of Latvia”); on 
countering threats to the information space (e.g., “[t]he main external threat to the information space of 
Latvia is the informative policy employed by Russia aimed at ruining political, economic and social 
sustainability and stability of Latvia…”) (Saeima, 2019, ch.4-8).  
Similar to the national security concept of 2015, also the current one from 2019 mentions Russia in 
the chapter devoted to countering of the economic threats. Again, it is done in a fairly descriptive and 
nonsecuritizing manner regarding Russia’s supply of natural gas and its cargo transit policy (Saeima, 2019, 
ch.9)). Russia is here presented as a source of economic uncertainty, though not as an existential threat.  
The remaining document – the current state defence concept of 2020 – mentions Russia 19 times. 
Russia’s name dominates the security environment’s sub-chapter on regional trends (it contains all but one 
of the mentions). Russia is slammed for its “defiant and aggressive military and hybrid activities”. It is 
detailed that the country attempts to influence domestic processes elsewhere, while at home dissidents are 
persecuted ever more. It is concluded that for Russia “…everything that brings no punishment or response 
is licit”. It is also argued that for domestic consumption it will continue portraying itself as “an entrenched 
fortress,” while negative Latvia’s image there will be further facilitated (Saeima, 2020, ch.1.2). 
On a more military note, Russia’s advancements in capabilities directed westwards are underlined, and, 
it is assumed, the most likely military action plots are “hybrid war and sudden attack”. Furthermore, Russia’s 
readiness to threaten or even to use nuclear weapons is underlined (Saeima, 2020, ch.1.2). Finally, Russia’s 
name is invoked in the sub-chapter of conventional defence of Latvia. There, its military advancement serves 
as a reason for emphasizing the need to advance early warning systems (Saeima, 2020, ch.3.1.1.1). 
5. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Review of the Latvian national security and defence concepts from three decades provides a structured 
insight in a state-level approach to securitization. It illustrates how one country, in this case Russia, has been 
securitized and desecuritized in the documents that are intended to determine the framework of national 
security and state defence. Even though the applied approach, combining quantitative and qualitative 
content analysis, has its limitations (like risking omitting, misinterpreting, emphasizing or downgrading some 
nuances), it provides a different angle on the dynamics of state-level securitization processes.  
The analysis of Russia in the aforementioned documents points to that the documents are largely a 
reflection of the security situation of the time of their approval. These documents reflect the institutional 
and political perceptions and decisions in the domestic and international context of that time. Hence, most 
of Latvia’s national security and state defence concepts (up until the Ukraine crisis) have been limited in 
their pre-emptive and future-proof nature (at least regarding Russia). This is not to say that future trends 
can be always foreseen. Rather, that, despite lessons from history, prevailing trends and vast literature on 
Russia, the national security and state defence concepts have not used the potential of all available expertise. 
Put in terms of securitization, if a referent object (in this case Latvia) is existentially threatened by another 
object that in similar forms has been there in the past and has previously created existential threats (in this 
case Russia and its legal predecessor, the Soviet Union), then this should logically be seen an objective 
existential threat and should also be securitized. As our analysis demonstrated, this has not always been the 
case. Can an existential threat from the same source disappear and then again reappear? Or rather it was 
intentionally or unintentionally neglected, or essentially undersecuritized?  
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To elaborate the aforementioned point in empirical terms, after having regained independence from 
the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Russian armed forces in 1991 and 1994 respectively, national 
security and state defence concepts from the mid-1990s and early 2000s demonstrated cautiousness in regard 
to Russia – mainly avoiding securitizing, or desecuritizing it. This approach can be in part explained by the 
fragility of the security and external environment – having an operating Russian military installation in Latvia 
until 1998 and being on the road to the EU and NATO at the time when the Western partners tried to 
engage with Russia.  
Similar trends ensued after Latvia joined the EU and NATO in 2004. The first two documents in the 
new status even did not address Russia by name. The 2008 Russo-Georgian war was a concussion to the 
perception of security situation in Latvia and beyond, though it peculiarly did not receive any attention in 
the first national security concept after that war. The 2008 war had no fundamental impact on security policy 
making for the years to come (not only exemplified by the security and defence concepts, but also by the 
following neglect of the Latvian armed forces, among many other examples). Even though the 2008 war led 
to securitization of Russia in the national security concept of 2011, the state defence concept of 2012 went 
on again over a Russia-desecuritizing path. 
Approaches and patterns changed rather fundamentally with Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. It left 
visible impact at all levels of national security and state defence policy, including the national security and 
state defence concepts from 2015 and on. It was perceived as a strategic and security wake-up call for 
decision-makers and society alike. The surge of securitization of Russia was evident, as presented in Figure 
1, even raising questions of a possible oversecuritization at the expense of other security issues. This leads 
us to possible lessons learned for the future national security and defence concepts. Most notably, it would 
be advisable to maintain a broad vision of the national security and state defence approach. And there is the 
task to identify and essentially securitize (but not necessarily oversecuritize) objective risks and threats 
notwithstanding short-term domestic or international exigencies. 
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